Iran, Georgia, Russia

I know I am over due in providing an Iranian perspective on the Russian/US stand off, which has GREAT implications for Iran. But, luckily someone else has said what I had to (emphasis is mine):

IRAN: US-RUSSIAN TENSION CREATES NEW DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS FOR TEHRAN
(Naj: Not necessarily though)
Kamal Nazer Yasin 8/22/08

The ongoing crisis in the Caucasus, sparked by Russia’s incursion into Georgia, can open new diplomatic opportunities for Iran. Officials in Tehran are currently treading cautiously, however, keeping their options open as they seek to maximize the benefits of renewed confrontation between the United States and Russia.

Conventional wisdom holds that the breakdown in US-Russian relations could bring immediate benefits for Iran’s nuclear program. Given the fallout over Georgia, many US experts believe Russia will now obstruct American-led efforts in the UN Security Council to expand sanctions against Iran that aim to pressure Tehran into giving up its nuclear aspirations.

But while Iranian officials certainly would like to see Russia veto any proposal to tighten the sanctions regime, they are not counting on Moscow to do so. Iranian experts say Russia in the past has proven to be a fickle friend. Thus, many in Tehran do not believe the Kremlin’s policy on the Iranian nuclear issue is necessarily linked to the twists and turns of US-Russian ties. While Moscow may be intent on tweaking Washington, Russian leaders may still see it as in their best interests to maintain solidarity with the other members of the so-called 5+1 group, comprising the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russia, in any event, cannot be considered an inveterate friend of Iran. In several notable instances, in particular in the ongoing process on the territorial division of the Caspian Sea, the Kremlin has acted more like an enemy than an ally of Iran. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "Relations between Iran and Russia can best be described as a ‘marriage of convenience," said one Tehran political scientist, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The partnership has never been one of equals. For the past three decades, Iran has been dependent on Russia -- for diplomatic support, arms sales and technological assistance in the nuclear sphere. "Iranian leaders are aware of it [the dependency] and they resent it, but there was very little they could do about it," said the Tehran political scientist.

Iran’s wariness of Russia’s commitment to the bilateral relationship is reflected to Tehran’s studied silence when it comes to the Caucasus crisis. In sharp contrast to other perceived friends of Russia -- in particular Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, who voiced full support for Russia’s military action in Georgia, then inked an arms deal in Sochi -- Iran has refrained from taking sides in the Caucasus conflict. [Naj: Iran has good reasons for staying silent: 1) Iran cannot condemn Georgia because Iran's dealing with her own secessionists and would be dealing with them heavy-handedly as Georgia did. 2) Iran cannot condemn Russia because Russia's weakening the Americans, which is what Iran really needs now. 3) Iran cannot support Russia because it is a foreign invasion in the name of "human rights and democracy" which mirrors America's action in Iraq. 4) Iran cannot support Georgia because Georgia's is sucking up to the US! So Iran is doing what is always does during WW-like conflicts: remain silent and neutral]

The Iranian Foreign Ministry adopted a decidedly neutral tone when addressing the Russian-Georgian conflict, resorting to diplomatic platitudes that countries use when they don’t want to commit themselves. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi stated simply at an August 12 briefing that Tehran was "following current developments in the Caucasus and urge[s] the belligerent parties to resolve their disputes through peaceful means."

Since then, Iranian officials have uttered nary a word about the conflict. The low-profile approach seems to indicate that pragmatists in Tehran have control of the foreign policy wheel. Iranian neo-conservatives who are loyal to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have voiced discontent with Tehran’s current policy. "Our reticence only aids the camp that wishes US regional adversaries to remain silent while US supporters come to the support of [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili," noted an August 16 commentary published in Kayhan, a newspaper that is strongly supportive of Ahmadinejad.

Experts in Tehran believe the Iran’s foreign policy establishment is playing a waiting game in the expectation that deepening US-Russian acrimony will open up new diplomatic avenues that Tehran can use to end its international diplomatic isolation. "A whole new set of options may be opening up for Iran," said an Iran-based expert.

According to some prominent US experts, Iran’s strategic assessment of the situation is sound -- the United States and Russia appear headed for a period of prolonged hostility. "This war [in Georgia] was an early sign of escalating Russian assertiveness" in the Caspian Basin, said Gail Lapidus, a regional expert at Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies. Lapidus added that NATO members will likely feel compelled to take counter-measures to check Kremlin attempts to reassert Russia’s influence in the former Soviet sphere.

From Tehran’s perspective, creating new opportunities requires leverage, and the only way to obtain it is if Iran can play Russia against the United States and European Union, or vice versa. Currently -- with the Bush administration in power in Washington, and Ahmadinejad occupying the Iranian presidency -- few in Tehran are under any illusions that Iran can engage in substantive cooperation with the United States in the near term. But some experts and officials believe that present circumstances, especially given the US-Russian acrimony, could change quickly.

"Iran’s rather neutral stance on the [Caucasus] can be read as a signal to the United States," said the Tehran political scientist. Many in Iran’s foreign policy establishment remain interested in trying to restore diplomatic relations with the United States, which would open up the possibility of Iran serving as a major conduit for funneling Caspian Basin energy westward. The fighting in Georgia has exposed the vulnerability of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and other routes. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"If the United States was to open an interest section in Iran, perhaps neighboring countries [such as Turkmenistan] would see this as the start of a thaw in US-Iranian relations -- the real opening they are waiting for in order to boost their trade or oil and gas shipments [via Iran]," said a European-based energy analyst, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Of course, there are numerous obstacles that currently impede a normalization of relations between the United States and Iran. But Iran could at least gain leverage with Russia if it can create the appearance that a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington is possible.

In doing so, Iranian officials would be looking to coax Moscow into following through on numerous commitments, such as completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant and selling advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Iran. Tehran could also possibly use the US-Russian tension to try to break down Russian and Chinese opposition to admitting Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Editor’s Note: Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.
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Trivia:

Gerogia was an Iranian state, taken away by the Russians some 200 years ago

Iran supplied fuel to US-backed Georgia in 2006 when Russia cut them off gas supplies
Fossil fuel energy is not the only form of energy offered to Georgia