A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done?

The Institute for National Security Studies of Israel had published a memorandum by Dr. Ephraim Kam, evaluating scenarios of Iran’s likely acquisition of nuclear weapons and possible diplomatic and military responses. You can get the full text of the memo from Israel’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

Here's a few excerpts from this 90 page document:
(page 27)
Iran’s hostility towards and continued isolation from the United States have been prominent characteristics of the radical Islamic regime in Tehran from the outset, and concessions in this realm would be interpreted as substantial erosion of the regime’s ideology, if not of the regime itself. This makes it difficult for Iran to agree to a deal with the United States even though the American administration is willing to talk to Iran (which is not the case), and the antagonism within the Bush administration and political circles in the United States does not facilitate a deal with Iran anytime in the near future. (so the Jewish state is not really supportive of Bush's rhetoric either!) What does Iran’s conduct suggest about the chances of achieving a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue? On the one hand, Iran has shown that it is determined to build a full nuclear fuel cycle, which in practice will allow it to retain the option of pursuing nuclear weapons. Due to Iran’s staunch interest in attaining this goal, it is reasonable to assume that Iran will not make concessions on this issue. In addition, after committing itself publicly and repeatedly to continue building a full fuel cycle, which includes uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, it would be difficult for Tehran to concede this point without its being deemed surrender to the United States. In order for Iran to be willing to make a comprehensive deal on ending its drive towards nuclear weapons, some or all of certain conditions are critical: a change in the internal balance of power of the Iranian leadership in favor of elements amenable to compromise on the nuclear issue; Iranian willingness to begin a meaningful dialogue with the American government; American willingness to offer Iran far-reaching proposals in political, economic, and technological realms; an overall change in the relationship between Iran and the United States; and Iranian understanding that it will pay a heavy price for continuing its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. These conditions do not yet exist, and the chances that the parties involved will succeed in reaching a comprehensive solution do not appear imminent.
(page 30)
There is no guarantee that Iran's nuclear program would be stopped by economic sanctions, which can be violated, subverted, or exchanged for different economic arrangements, and in any case, Iran may decide not to succumb to pressure despite economic hardship. At the same time, comprehensive and substantive international sanctions might result in the suspension or halt of Iran’s nuclear program, due to the vulnerability of the Iranian economy and the implications of economic distress on domestic stability. Iran will be able to bear the sanctions to a certain degree, and the people of Iran are initially likely to support the regime in the face of pressures. And yet while extended sanctions are expected to cause social unrest, past behavior of various governments vis-à-vis their relations with Iran suggests that the imposition of sanctions will not garner wide endorsement, because at least in the short term, these governments do not regard Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as a significant enough threat to justify the loss of substantial income due to sanctions.
(page 32)
For its part, Israel cannot contribute in any way to the diplomatic efforts underway to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Israel has nothing to offer the Iranians in exchange for halting their project, and it has no channels of meaningful dialogue with the Iranian regime. Israel has also not been a participant (direct or indirect) in the recent negotiations with Iran. In actuality, the only way Israel can contribute to the negotiations is by means of the intensified pressure resulting from the assumption that Israel possesses the military capability to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in the event that talks on the subject fail. Israel can also try to obtain high quality intelligence on Iran's nuclear program.
(on page 34 there is a fun-to-read description of how perilous it would be for Israelis to attack Iran from air! Admitting that Iran is not the piece of cake that Iraq was!)
This difficult and sensitive operation is complicated even further by the broad geographical distribution of Iranian nuclear facilities. It is impossible to neutralize Iran’s nuclear capability by attacking just one facility, as Israel did in Iraq. While comprehensive damage would not require destroying all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would require striking at least three or four sites involved with uranium enrichment and plutonium production. It is also doubtful whether Israel would be able to maintain the element of surprise as it did in Iraq, because the Iranians fear such an attack and have therefore prepared for it.
(Page 36)
Iran no longer appears to be significantly dependent on external sources for the acquisition of nuclear technology, and it already possesses most of the knowledge required for developing fissile material. Iran possesses nuclear raw material; it manufactures centrifuges for uranium enrichment; the large facility that it built for uranium enrichment is almost complete; it operates a facility for uranium conversion; it claims to have succeeded in enriching uranium; it has built a heavy water facility; it has carried out plutonium separation tests; and it appears to have a sufficient quantity of well-trained and professional personnel. This means that even if a few main Iranian facilities are attacked, Iran will be able to construct alternative sites within a short time if it is allowed to do so undisturbed.
(page 38, here he bring my point home about the Arab government's hypocrisy, sounds somehow nostalgic that Iran and Israel are not buddies:)
Finally, an Israeli attack that damages the Iranian nuclear program would serve the interests of many countries, such as the United States, other Western countries, and Muslim and Arab countries that regard Iran as a threat. Nonetheless, considerable criticism of such an attack would certainly emanate from these same countries. Some will see the attack as an act of aggression against the Muslim world as a whole, which could undermine Israel’s delicate relations with Arab and Muslim countries, and some might opt for diplomatic measures against Israel. In any event, many will see the attack as a joint AmericanIsraeli operation, especially if it becomes clear that there was advance coordination between the two countries. This could increase feelings of hostility towards the United States throughout the Arab and Muslim world. However, despite the expected criticism and condemnations, it is likely that for several reasons Israel in the long term will not be forced to pay a high price in the international arena: Iran’s nuclear activities are seen as defying the international consensus; the vast majority of the countries involved favor the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program; and President Ahmadinejad’s statements about wiping out Israel have bolstered the impression that Iran constitutes a threat to Israel’s existence, justifying actions of self-defense.
(now you see why this mistranslation is being so eternally used?!!)
Now in the hypothetical case that Iran DOES SUCCEED in obtaining the nuclear weapons, the memo proposes the following courses of action for Israel:
(page 11)
• Adopt the position that the leading powers, especially the United States, and not an individual country in the region, are responsible for preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, (this is what I call chickenshit!) and disarming it by both military and political means should Iran achieve nuclear capability. A nuclear Iran threatens the critical interests of the United States and other countries, and a superpower is better equipped to address the threat and handle the outcome of its actions. (that's why AIPAC exists.) At the same time, Israel must make sure not to be seen as encouraging the American administration to attack Iran.
• Continue to declare publicly that under the present circumstances Israel cannot accept a nuclear-enabled Iran. In practical terms, Israel must develop an independent course of action against Iran's potential nuclearization.
• Bolster its deterrence against Iran, which might be reduced if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.
• Intensify strategic cooperation with the United States and other countries with regard to Iran. Israel’s aim should be for the American government to convey to Iran in no uncertain terms that an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would be considered an attack on the United States itself...(work for AIPAC)
• Reassess its own policy of nuclear ambiguity.
• Examine the possibility of signing a peace treaty with Syria, in the hope that this severs Syria’s close relationship with Iran and Syrian support of Hizbollah. Entering into peaceful relations with Syria would result in further improvements in Israel’s relations with other Arab countries, reduce the influence of Iran’s militant approach, and perhaps result in a dialogue between Israel and Iran.

The conclusion: Can Israel live with a nuclear Iran? The report concludes: Yup!! Under what condition? Open communication between Iran and Israel!


This is a very educational and balanced report, nonwithstanding the paranoia.